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Abstract 
This study examines how inter-firm heterogeneities in technology modes and 
intensities are linked to ownership of firms in India, using a panel dataset of 2000 
odd Bombay Stock Exchange listed firms for the period from 2003 to 2014 drawn 
from the PROWESS database of CMIE. For the analysis, foreign ownership is 
categorised according to the control exercisable by them as defined under the 
Companies’ Act of India. A comparative analysis of domestic and different 
categories of foreign firms was conducted at two time periods: the global boom 
period of 2004-2008 and post crisis period of 2008-2014. The propensity score 
matching (PSM) analysis reveals that the majority owned foreign companies 
spend less on R&D and more on technology transfers than their local 
counterparts. Overall, threshold equity holding and global conditions matter. A 
panel data regression analysis on matched sample confirms the findings and 
validates the PSM findings. A horizontal cluster analysis on 3-digit industry level 
data shows that foreign firms cluster in high technology industries. 
  
JEL classification: G21; G32; K22; L25 
 
Key words: Foreign firms, Majority owned foreign subsidiaries, minority owned 
subsidiaries, domestic firms, performance  
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1. Introduction 
 
Rapid advances in new technologies reinforced by the process of globalization 
have exposed firms in developing countries to intense technological competition 
both in the domestic and export markets. Conscious efforts towards building 
technological capabilities are increasingly becoming vital for them to survive. But, 
building these capabilities is costly, cumulative and evolutionary; it takes time 
and is uncertain (Lall, 1992). Since MNEs are a major source of cutting edge 
technology and innovation, developing countries’ governments encourage them 
to set up local production facilities in the hope that the latter would bring new 
technologies and help build technological capabilities of the local firms through 
labour turn overs, imitation, competition and demonstration. While there are 
direct channels of international technology transfers for local firms (for instance, 
licensing arrangements and imports of capital goods), FDI is expected to be 
instrumental in transferring the latest technologies to these countries. There is 
almost consensus in the literature that the latest and proprietary technologies 
are transferred through internalization (Dunning, 1993). More than 80% of 
royalty payments for international technology transfers were made by affiliates to 
their parent companies (UNCTAD, 1997 and 2005). Thus the presence of MNEs 
itself is assumed to entail technology transfers to local firms though spillover 
effects, even if they do not indulge in R&D in the host countries. But, there is also 
a possibility that MNEs directly undertake R&D activities in the host countries to 
adapt technologies to suit to local conditions and/or seek new assets to increase 
group capabilities as a strategic decision (Kuemmerle, 1999; Narula, 2004; 
Pearce, 1999). These R&D active MNE subsidiaries may provide better access 
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to foreign knowledge, and enable host countries to integrate more 
advantageously into global innovation networks (Cantwell and Piscitello 2000, 
Carlsson 2006). Embeddedness of MNEs into the local R&D networks may thus 
ensure more profound knowledge spillover to local firms. As a result there is 
growing competition among countries for high value adding R&D active FDI in 
recent years. Even while most R&D and patenting activities are largely 
concentrated in the MNEs’ home countries, and in a few developed host 
countries, there is evidence of relocation of R&D activities by them to developing 
countries (Dachs et al, 2014; Hall, 2010; Lundan and Dunning,2009; OECD, 
2008a). It is against this background that this paper analyses whether MNEs are 
significantly different from their local counterparts in terms of their technology 
intensities and forms of technology activities in a developing economy with a 
special reference to India. We identify three main forms of technological 
activities:  (i) local R&D efforts, (ii) licensing arrangements with foreign (parents 
for MNE affiliates) firms for technology acquisitions, and (iii) imports of 
technologies embodied in capital goods. The objective is to investigate whether 
MNEs undertake larger R&D spending than their local counterparts or they are 
more likely to acquire technologies from their own global networks through 
licensing and imports of capital goods. As noted above, the choice of 
technological spending by them may have different implications for the host 
developing countries.  
 
The analysis is based on the propensity score matching method followed by 
regression techniques, using the panel data for the period of 2003-04 to 2013-14. 
The data was partitioned into two periods: the boom period of 2003-04 to 
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2007-08, and the global crisis period of 2008-09 to 2013-14. For each period we 
conducted a separate analysis to investigate the impact of global conditions on 
the choices of foreign and local firms and validate our results. Evidence 
suggests that global relocation of R&D activities has suffered during the global 
crisis of the post 2008 (Dachs and Zahradnik, 2014; Kinkel and Som, 2012) 
 
The distribution of corporate R&D spending is highly skewed across industries. A 
few high-tech sectors account for the overwhelming share of R&D activity 
(Hirscheya et al. 2010). It has also been observed that R&D spending in high 
tech sectors is more effective in closing productivity gaps than that in other 
sectors (Ortega-Argilés et al, 2009). Thus, the analysis of differential 
technological behaviour of foreign and local firms is meaningful only if MNEs 
predominate in R&D intensive sectors. It is likely that MNEs do not even target 
these sectors. Rather, they concentrate in resource or labour intensive industries 
seeking access to cheap resources. For our analysis therefore we shall begin by 
identifying the sectoral distribution of MNEs by technological intensity in India 
using the cluster analysis.  
  
Economic reforms introduced in 1991 marked a transition of the Indian economy 
from an import substituting to an outward oriented regime. Since then the 
government of India has carried out massive economic reforms to promote the 
integration of the Indian economy with the rest of the world (Aggarwal and Kumar, 
2012). One of the most important dimensions of these reforms is the lowering of 
barriers for foreign direct investment. The FDI regime had been fairly restrictive 
in India between the late 1960s and the early 1990s when ‘technological 
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self-reliance’ was adopted as one of the key objectives of the growth strategy. 
Numerous restrictions were imposed to attract FDI only in core technology 
intensive industries where little technological progress had been made in the 
country. These included, restrictions on the ownership control, entry and growth 
of foreign companies including, setting up of joint ventures with domestic 
partners, local content clauses, export obligations, promotion of local R and D 
and so on. In the open regime of the post 1991 however, the government has 
directed its policy towards investment liberalization, promotion and facilitation, 
and has been increasingly amending the investment laws and guidelines to 
facilitate inflows of FDI. Since 2005, the country has opened nearly all economic 
sectors for FDI as a step towards FDI-induced growth strategy. The present 
analysis therefore is expected to have important policy implications for other 
countries that have adopted a similar path of growth. 
 
There have been several studies analyzing the R&D behavior of firms. Most 
studies include a variable representing foreign ownership as one of the 
explanatory variables. However, the focus has essentially been on the 
relationship between local R&D and technology imports (Kumar and Siddharthan, 
1997; Sasidharan and Kathuria, 2011 for literature surveys). To the best of my 
knowledge, there is no systematic analysis of the differential technological 
behavior of local and foreign firms in the Indian context. Further, while the 
International Business literature has evolved both, theoretically and empirically 
to better test and explain the differential behavior of foreign and local firms, most 
studies for developing countries in particular those in South Asia are still 
embedded in the classical frameworks and remain beset by the lack of good 
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quality data and weak methodology. It is therefore important to revisit the 
comparative analysis of technological behavior of firms by ownership.  
 
Methodologically, a key problem in evaluating the differential behavior of the 
local and foreign firms is that the investment decision of foreign firms is not 
independent from factors determining performance indicators. Better 
performance of foreign affiliates may for instance simply reflect the fact that they 
are attracted to high technology industries (Bellak, 2004; Girma et al. 
2001;Globerman et al. 1994, p. 144; Howenstine and Zeile 1992, p. 53;). 
Selection bias can thus be a major problem in such studies. There are recent 
studies (Damijan et al., 2003; Javorcick and Spatareanu, 2008; Hake,2009) that 
explicitly address the question of selection bias. However, there is none for India. 
Furthermore, most existing studies are concerned with foreign ownership; the 
strategic importance of ownership holding is largely ignored. Finally, the 
firm-ownership data available from secondary sources which form the basis of 
most studies in particularly for India is subject to several limitations and that 
there is a lack of transparency in the identification of foreign firms. The present 
study contributes to the existing literature by addressing these gaps in the exiting 
literature. 
 
The rest of the study is organized into 6 sections. Section 2 discusses the 
changing role of FDI in the Indian economy and establishes the need for the 
present analysis. Section 3 describes the theoretical underpinnings of the 
analysis. Sections 4 and 5 provide methodological and data related details while 
Section 6 presents empirical results. Finally, Section 7 concludes the findings.  
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2. FDI in India 
 
Empirical evidence suggests that there has been a tremendous increase in 
inward FDI in India during the post reform period particularly after 2005. In 
absolute terms, the FDI inflows grew from roughly $129 million in 1991-92 to 
over $46 billion in 2011-12. It declined somewhat in later years though. Figure 1 
shows that, over the 25-year period, growth in FDI inflows has been relatively 
steady2. It accelerated in 2006-07 due to relaxation in FDI norms in construction 
and real estate, and continued to grow since then. Not only that, the IFDI inflows 
as percent of GDP also grew steadily. The ratio improved from less than 2% to 
over 4.5 in 2009-10, but declined thereafter to touch 3.8% in 2013-14.  
  
Figure 1: IFDI flows and the ratio with GDP in India: 1991-92 to 2013-14 
 
Source: RBI Monthly bulletins, various issues 
 
Correspondingly, the stock of FDI also increased astronomically from a mere 
2 FDI statistics compiled by the RBI in the Balance of Payments prior to 2000 included only equity capital. In 2000-01, 
following the IMF’s definition, it incorporated equity capital, reinvested earnings (retained earnings of FDI companies) and 
‘other direct investment capital’ (intracompany loans or intra-company debt transactions) also.  
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$1984 million in 1992 to US $226,748 million in 2013 (UNCTAD website on FDI 
statistics). According to the RBI Census survey, the total foreign liabilities in FDI 
was $1230 in 1992 which rose sharply to US 233,678 million in March 2013 and 
further to US $264,672 as on March 31, 2015 (RBI, 2015). Nearly half of the total 
FDI stock at market prices was in the manufacturing sector. Information and 
communication services (15.5 per cent) and financial and insurance activities 
(13.6 per cent) were other major activities attracting FDI. 
  
Globally, India has become one of the most attractive destinations of FDI 
improving its position vis-à-vis other countries. In 2005-06 it was the 4th largest 
recipient of FDI in the world. After the global crisis of 2008, it slipped out of the 
club of top 10 FDI recipients to enter again in 20143. In South Asia, it accounts 
for more than 90% of the total IFDI.  
 
It must also be noted that there been a proliferation of wholly or majority owned 
foreign companies in the county in the post reform period. The foreign share in 
total equity of foreign companies was high at 70.1 per cent as at end 2013 which 
further increase to 72% as at the end of 2014 (RBI, 2014,2015). In 
manufacturing it was as high as 85% (RBI, 2015). This is significant because 
prior to 1991-92, foreign equity share was restricted to 40% in most sectors. 
It will therefore be interesting to analyse how the removal of restrictions on 
MNEs and conducive environment have affected their technological activity 
within the country.  
3 However, it is the only BRIC country that could not cross $50 billion. 
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3. Theoretical discussion 
 
Technological activities: MNEs vs local firms 
 
The MNE is not a compact, rationally conceived organization with a uniform goal, 
but a differentiated network of relatively autonomous subsidiaries which have to 
face heterogeneous national contexts (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990, Hedlund 
1986; and Perlmutter 1969). These networks comprise not only of MNE units but 
also its relationships with external customers, suppliers and authorities. 
International business literature identifies three levels of networks:  
 Intra-organisational networks that refer to the relationship between 
headquarters and subsidiaries, and to the relationship that subsidiaries have 
with each other 
 Inter-organisational networks that refer to relationship with other 
organisations in joint ventures, strategic alliances and licensing agreements, 
 Local networks with customers, suppliers and authorities, 
 
The earlier IB literature adopts essentially a top-down approach and expects 
majority owned firms to be more ‘intra-organizational network’ embedded. This 
literature, comprising of the industrial organisation (Caves 1996; Hymer 1976) 
and transaction cost theories (Dunning 1993; Hennart, 1982; Williamson, 1975), 
argues that the existence of MNEs hinges on the relative monopolistic 
advantages that they enjoy against the rival local firms. They derive their 
competitive advantages from the assets that they have generated in their home 
countries. Activities such as R&D, generating firm-specific assets are mostly 
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being carried out at the headquarters. They are expected to transfer their 
technologies from the home to host countries to generate monopolistic 
advantages. They are thus more likely to depend upon imports of technologies 
from their internal networks and are less likely to engage in R&D activities in the 
host country than their local counterparts.  
 
The Resource Based View (RBV) turns the focus from the firm (MNE) to the 
subsidiary (Barney, 1991; Peng 2001; Rugman et al., 2011). It conceptualizes a 
MNE subsidiary as ‘a semi-autonomous entity with its own entrepreneurial 
potential (Andersson et al., 2007; Birkinshaw et al. 2005, p. 227; Bouquet and 
Birkinshaw, 2008; Do¨rrenba¨ cher and Geppert, 2011; Forsgren et al., 2005; 
Rugman et al., 2011). Thus, subsidiary growth is driven by its own distinctive 
capabilities developed through the entrepreneurial efforts of subsidiary 
management. According to the power and internal politics approach, a 
subsidiary is competing internally as part of the MNE network with other 
subsidiaries for the allocation of MNE’s scarce resources (for instance, new 
investment, positive attention from MNE top management team), and externally 
with host country competitors (Andersson et al, 2001). Therefore, it becomes 
inevitable for a subsidiary to develop its own strategies that can enhance its 
competitive position, both internally and externally for intra-organizational 
negotiations (Do¨rrenba¨cher and Gammelgaard, 2006; Peng & Wang, 2000). In 
this framework, subsidiaries are likely to have a considerable R&D spending and 
out-compete the local firms in terms of R&D spending. Their technological 
embeddedness in local networks may have a positive impact on technology 
transfers to the host country.  
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The network approach on the other hand postulates that the subsidiaries’ 
enhance their competitiveness through cooperative efforts (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 
1986). Their behavior is contingent on the host country and subsidiary specific 
factors, and strategic considerations of setting them up. Their relations with 
external customers and suppliers (business embeddedness) and the 
collaborative development of new products and processes (technical 
embeddedness) influence technological competence of the whole company 
(Andersson et al. 2002). Subsidiaries with high technology spending and 
competencies are thus designated as contributors or strategic leaders (Bartlett 
and Ghoshal, 1986, p. 90; Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005). Their role is not just 
'home-base exploiting' (Kuemmerle, 1999). Instead, they become home base 
augmenting by generating new technology (Cantwell and Janne, 1999; Pearce, 
1999; Zander, 1999). But an important resource for technological competencies 
of subsidiaries is the local innovation system which increases the potential skill 
base of subsidiaries; the better these systems are, the better a subsidiary can 
contribute to technology generation within the MNE network (Cantwell and 
Mudambi, 2005; Lundan and Dunning, 2009). Also the strategic intent/ 
investment motive behind establishing the subsidiary may influence its conduct 
in the host country economies.  
 
Considering that theoretical arguments are conflicting, we set up two competing 
hypotheses for the analysis: 
 
 H1: the MNE subsidiaries in India have R&D intensity significantly higher 
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than that of local firms, and 
 H2: the MNE subsidiaries are embedded in the intra organisational 
networks and exhibit higher spending on royalty payments for technology 
imports from these networks than their local counterparts  
 
Ownership holding and technological activity 
 
Theoretically, there is almost consensus that the parent that supplies the most 
critical proprietary resources is more likely to maintain controlling ownership 
stakes over the affiliates. However, its implication for technology activities of 
MNE subsidiaries in the host country is ambiguous. While the classical IB 
theories postulate that the strategic ownership ‘control over the resources 
ensures greater embeddedness of these subsidiaries within the internal 
networks to minimize leakages of their proprietary technology, the recent 
literature argues that subsidiaries that are subject to strategic controls are more 
likely to compete for excellence and commit larger resources to R&D spending. 
This is because such subsidiaries are more likely to be assessed in regard to 
long-term objectives of the firm. The institutional approach supports this view 
and argues that a firm’s strategic behaviour is influenced by the surrounding 
institutional environment (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Dunning and Lundan, 
2008, Meyer and Rowan 1977; Geppert and Williams, 2006; Peng and Khoury, 
2008 ;). When the regulatory environment is weak in the host country or the 
social and cultural distance between the home and host countries is large, the 
company lowers its control and commits lower resources. Thus, the lower the 
control, the lower is the support that subsidiaries receive from their parents for 
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local initiatives. Once again, given the conflicting arguments, we test two 
competing hypotheses 
 
H3: Majority owned subsidiaries with controlling stakes exhibit a greater 
tendency to embed in local networks and incur larger R&D expenditures 
than their local counterparts.  
H4: Majority owned subsidiaries with controlling stakes are more likely to 
depend on imports of technologies from their parents and other internal 
network actors.  
 
4. Methodology 
 
For empirical analysis, we used a multilevel methodology. In what follows we 
discuss that briefly.  
 
Identifying foreign firms 
  
In India, a direct investment enterprise is defined, in keeping with the IMF 
guidelines, as an incorporated or unincorporated enterprise in which a foreign 
direct investor owns 10 per cent or more of the ordinary shares or voting power 
(for an incorporated enterprise) or the equivalent (for an unincorporated). There 
is however recognition that a numerical guideline of 10% does not capture the 
essence of FDI for economic analysis. This is adopted essentially for the sake of 
consistency and cross-country comparability of the FDI statistics, and is based 
on the premise that a share as low as 10 per cent of voting rights or equity 
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capital allows the investor to ‘influence the management’ and provides the basis 
for a FDI relationship. The System of National Accounts (SNA) Framework of the 
UN with an objective of facilitating economic analysis on the impact of FDI uses 
“controlling stakes” as the basis for defining FDI  for which more than 50% 
ownership is necessary. OECD (2008b) defines companies with 50% or more 
stake as FDI subsidiaries (controlled enterprises) while those with 10-50% of the 
stake, FDI associates (influenced enterprises). In line with this approach, for the 
present analysis of firm level performance, we considered three categories of 
foreign companies based on the right of the shareholders as defined in the 
Indian Companies’ Act. The Act defines three threshold levels of shareholding 
from the perspective of defining “influence” and” control” on the management. 
These are: 10%, 25% and 50%. Based on this classification and the available 
data, we identified four types of foreign firms:  
  
 Minority holding (10-25%) with minor influence 
 Dominant minority holding  (25-50%) with dominant influence 
 Majority holding (above 50%) with controlling stake 
 Experiential foreign firms which are not predominantly foreign firms during the 
selected period but do have foreign ownership for a short period.   
  
Investigating the sectoral distribution of MNEs by technology intensity: Cluster 
analysis 
 
To investigate whether the MNEs target high tech industries in the first place, we 
clustered the three digit industries by technological orientation and brand value. 
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There are two different procedures that can be used to cluster data: hierarchical 
cluster analysis and k-means cluster. Since we did not know the number of 
clusters in advance, we eliminated the latter and focused on the former. Of the 
different methods of hierarchical clustering, we used the Wards linkage method. 
Based on the dendogram and the Calinski and Harabasz (1974) and Duda, Hart 
and Stork (2001) stopping rules we determined the number of clusters in the 
sample and then examined the presence of foreign firms by ownership stake in 
each group.   
 
Assessing the difference in technology intensity and activity between the local 
and foreign owned firms:  
 
Propensity Score Matching: As stated earlier, MNEs are likely to exhibit higher 
technology intensities due to a package of competitive advantages that they 
possess. But these advantages also provide the reasons of their investing in a 
host country. It is therefore important to control the effect of these variables 
before analyzing the impact of foreign ownership. The usual approach in 
correcting the selection bias is by using instrumental variables. Since most 
variables that affect foreign acquisition also affect technology intensity, this 
approach is inappropriate in the case of FDI. We have therefore used propensity 
score matching (PSM) to control for endogeneity.  
 
PSM is a non-parametric estimation method works by creating a comparison 
group (local firms) with identical distributions of observable characteristics to 
those in the treatment group (foreign firms). The basic idea is to find, for every 
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foreign firm, a matching local firm in terms of all relevant observable 
characteristics X. All observable covariates are controlled simultaneously by 
matching on a single variable, the propensity score. The mean effect of foreign 
ownership can then be calculated as the average difference in outcomes 
between the foreign and matched local firms. More specifically, if P=1 for foreign 
firms and P =0 for the local firms, then the average treatment effect on treated 
(ATT) on an outcome variable Y (technology spending) is 
   
ATT= E (Y1-Y0|P=1), 
which means, 
ATT= E (Y1|P=1)-E (Y0|P=1) 
 
While data on E (Y1|P=1) i.e. foreign firms are available, estimation of the 
counterfactual E (Y0|P=1) is the expected value of technology spending of the 
matched local firms. In all, we identified four broad categories of the foreign firms 
as stated above, and correspondingly constructed four propensity score models 
using firm and industry specific attributes. In each case, the balancing property is 
satisfied. Following the standard practice to limit comparisons to a subset of 
cases lying on the common support of propensity scores, we dropped local firms 
with propensity scores that were larger/smaller than the maximum/minimum 
propensity score. Kernel method was used to identify the local firms that match 
the foreign firms. This is a type of weighted regression of the outcome on the 
treatment indicator variable, the kernel weights being a decreasing function of 
the absolute difference in propensity score between the treated and comparison 
unit (Smith and Todd, 2005). A Gaussian kernel with bandwidth of 0.06 was 
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used for the analysis. It must however be noted that while matching removes any 
bias caused by selection on observable variables, it leaves the possibility of bias 
due to selection on unobservable variables. Thus, perfect matching is not 
possible.  
 
Generalised least square regression on matched sample: The PSM analysis 
is supplemented by GLS based regression analysis. The variables representing 
technological activity are regressed on foreign ownership variables after 
controlling for the scale of operations, age, technological opportunities and 
demand conditions prevailing in the industry in which the firm operates, 
technology acquisition through other sources, capital intensity of production 
methods, outward orientation, internal flows of resources, and government policy, 
using the matched sample to control for both, the observed and unobservable 
attributes and produce a robust estimator.   
  
5. Data 
 
The Sample 
 
We used firm level data from PROWESS. It is a database of the financial 
performance of over 27,000 listed and unlisted Indian companies from a wide 
section of manufacturing, utilities, mining and service sectors. The data are 
collected by the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) from the balance 
sheet of companies supplemented by surveys. The database is updated 
continuously and typically covers the period 1990 on. This data is widely used in 
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firm level studies of India across the world. Along with financials, the database 
also provides detailed information on shareholding patterns of these companies. 
The latter however is subject to critical limitations which are often overlooked: 
first, this information is provided only for the latest year. Most studies use this 
data assuming that the foreign shareholding of firms remains the same over the 
years prior to the latest year. This assumption is not reasonable for listed firms 
because the shares of most these companies are actively traded in the market. 
Acquisition of shares of the existing firms in the market has become an important 
mode of entry for foreign firms in India. Second, the data for shareholding patters 
is based on convenience sampling which means that it is subject to availability. 
For the listed firms it is available only for those firms that are actively traded in 
the market and for unlisted firms it is subject to their permission. Clearly, the 
studies using this data are subject to selectivity bias. For different periods, the 
results may vary depending upon the availability of ownership data and firms’ 
ownership stakes in that year. There is evidence that the distributional properties 
of samples drawn from PROWESS are not consistent over different periods 
(Chaudhury, 2002). To address this limitation, we procured the month-wise 
ownership data of 5109 listed firms from 2000-1 to 2013-14. Interestingly, this 
database is also provided by PROWESS separately but gets largely ignored in 
the firm level analysis of FDI. We focused on this data as of March 31 of each 
year. It was matched with the SEBI data to validate it. It was observed that the 
data pertains only to actively traded firms. Therefore we cleaned this data to 
compare apples with apples following the two truncation rules. Firstly, we 
included only those firms for which the information was available for each of the 
11 years. The rest were dropped. We were thus left with 2004 firms. Secondly, 
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we dropped those firms reporting zero or negative netsales. After the cleaning 
process, our final data set consisted of a balanced panel of 1781 firms belonging 
to 280 three-digit manufacturing industries based on the National Industrial 
Classification (NIC) 1998 and spanning 11 years, from 2003 to 2014.  
 
Variables used in the analysis are defined in the Appendix Table A1. 
 
6. Empirical analysis  
 
Sectoral distribution of MNEs by technology intensity 
 
For the analysis, the firm level data was aggregated into 280 three digit level 
industry data for the period 2003-04 to 2007-08. This exercise was done only for 
the boom period. The crisis period was excluded from the cluster analysis to 
avoid any type of bias that might have affected technological efforts of firms 
asymmetrically across industries. The analysis was conducted using the sectoral, 
technology and product differentiation variables: R&D spending (RD_INT), 
royalty payments (ROY_INT), and capital goods imports (CAPIMP_INT), 
branding intensity (ADINT) and a dummy for manufacturing sector (MFG). All 
these variables were converted into a binary form and the ‘matching dissimilarity 
matrix’ method was used in the clustering procedure.  
 
Based on the standard rules as mentioned above, we identified 5 clusters of 
industries. All these clusters are well populated. None of them dominates in 
terms of the number of observations, and none of them represents a mere 
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residual category. This confirms that each cluster is substantive. Table 1 gives 
mean values on the variables in the five principal clusters. The main dividing line 
runs between principally manufacturing and service industries on the one hand, 
and between industries that score high and low on the technology and product 
differentiation variables on the other hand. Based on the mean values of the 
cluster variables we distinguished them into 5 categories as shown in Table 1.  
  
Table 1: Mean Values by clusters 
 
 Manufacturing Service 
Variable 
High Tech 
and high 
product 
differentiation  
Medium 
technology 
and high 
product 
differentiation 
Low 
technology 
and low 
product 
differentiation  
High Tech 
and high 
product 
differentiation  
Medium tech 
but high 
product 
differentiation 
No. of industries 83 67 53 25 52 
RD_INT 0.65  0.30 0.00 0.39 0.00 
ROY_INT 0.35 0.04 0.00 0.10 0.05 
CAPIMP_INT 1.79 2.54 1.19 2.32 3.50 
ADINT 1.50 2.17 0.91 0.98 3.02 
Note: See, Appendix table A1 for the definition of variables 
Source: Estimated by the author 
 
 
Table 2 reports clustering results by ownership of the firms (appendix table A1 
for definitions), which is of primary interest to us. It may be seen that the majority 
owned companies are by far the most advanced ones as over 62% of them 
during 2009-2014 belonged to the high-tech manufacturing cluster and almost 
one-fourth of them concentrated in the high-tech services cluster. Only about 
15% of them are classified as low-tech either in manufacturing or services. As 
stated above, the technological or brand superiority of MNEs is the primary 
reason why they venture into investing abroad in the first place. In India, this 
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pattern can also be attributed to the legal framework prior to 1991 which sought 
to channelise the activities of FDI into high technology production by setting 
higher FDI caps in these sectors. During 2004-08, the distribution of foreign 
companies was highly skewed in the favour of high tech manufacturing 
industries. As more policy reforms were introduced, services started becoming 
more promising in the late 2000s, and the distribution became somewhat 
diffused (as shown by standard deviations). But the changes in the sample were 
marginal rather than substantive.  
 
Table 2: Classification of firms by technological orientation of industries 
(%) 
 2003-04 to 2007-08 
  Majority owned  
Domina
nt__min
ority 
Minority 
owned 
Experie
ntial_FF 
Domestic 
firms 
High Tech and high product 
differentiation mfg 64.6 62.3 62.2 36.7 37.7 
Medium technology and high 
product differentiation mfg 6.3 7.5 2.7 10.0 13.2 
Low technology and low 
product differentiation mfg 1.3 9.4 13.5 0.0 5.5 
High Tech and high product 
differentiation services 19.0 18.9 13.5 46.7 32.2 
Medium  tech high product 
differentiation services 8.9 1.9 8.1 6.7 11.4 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Standard deviation 25.7 24.4 24.0 20.4 14.1 
 2008-09 to 2013-14 
 Majority owned 
Dominant_
_min 
Minority 
owned 
Experie
ntial_FF 
Domestic 
firms 
High Tech and high product 
differentiation mfg 62.4 56.0 50.0 46.2 37.7 
Medium technology and high 
product differentiation mfg 7.3 12.0 9.3 19.2 12.9 
Low technology and low 
product differentiation mfg 0.9 4.0 11.1 7.7 5.4 
High Tech and high product 
differentiation services 22.9 22.0 18.5 26.9 32.0 
Medium tech high product 
differentiation services 6.4 6.0 11.1 0.0 11.9 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Standard deviation 25.1 21.3 17.1 17.9 14.0 
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 There also appears to be substantial restructuring of firms in terms of ownership 
holding across the first 4 categories in the late 2000s. Within services, the share 
of experiential firms has declined sharply while that of other foreign firms has 
increased significantly across both high and low tech categories. In the 
manufacturing sector, on the contrary, the share of experiential firms has shown 
an upward movement. This reflects a clear shift of FDI from manufacturing to 
services. Within manufacturing, there is a visible shift of foreign firms in favour of 
the medium tech consumer goods. However, they continue to predominate in 
high tech sectors. A critical question is whether foreign firms are also more R&D 
active than their local counterparts or they continue to embed in internal 
knowledge networks.  
 
 
In the PSM and regression analyses we shall control for the effect of these 
sectors to control for the sectoral endogeneity. These groups are represented as 
HTECH_MFG, MTECH_MFG, LTECH_MFG, HTECH_SER, and MTECH_SER 
in the subsequent analysis. 
 
Propensity score matching 
 
While applying the PSM, we first estimate the predicted probability of receiving 
foreign investment, given several firm and industry characteristics. As discussed 
above, we have four treatment groups: majority owned foreign firms, dominant 
minority owned firms, and minority owned firms and experiential firms. For 
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pair-wise comparisons, we estimated four propensity score functions 
corresponding to each group of foreign firms. We have chosen the covariates 
based on the existing literature (Girma, 2005; Blonigen 2005; Dunning, 1993 for 
literature surveys), but also considering the available dataset. Variables 
representing technological activity have been excluded from the model as they 
are the outcome variables in the analysis. The probit model used for generating 
propensity scores is as follows 
 
FE= f (SIZE AGE CAP_INT EX_INT IMPR_INT, PCM, HTECH_MFG 
MTECH_MFG LTECH_MFG HTECH_SER MTECH_SER)  
 
Sectoral dummies pertain to the five broad sectors identified in the cluster 
analysis to capture the sectoral presence of MNEs. FE represents dummy 
variables for four groups of foreign firms (Appendix table A1). The probit 
coefficients of all the variables (available on request) differ noticeably in their 
statistical significance across models. The estimation of different propensity 
score functions for different binary combinations of foreign and domestic firms 
sets the stage for good quality matching. Using kernel density estimation 
techniques, MNEs were matched with local firms over a common region of the 
matching variables. We ensured that the distribution of covariates between the 
two groups is balanced. The condition of common support resulted in discarding 
some firms. The level of rejections of unmatched local firms varied between 14% 
and 23%. Considering that the there is a large number of local firms, this does 
not amount to a significant loss of data and is therefore unlikely to compromise 
the representativeness of the results. To assess the quality of matching, 
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appropriate tests were conducted. The results of matching for individual 
covariates (available on request) show that, there were large differences in the 
covariates between the foreign and local firms in the original sample. These 
differences are considerably reduced after kernel matching. In all the cases, the 
absolute mean bias turns out to be insignificant. Table 3 reports the summary 
results of matching quality assessment tests. The pseudo-R2 which is obtained 
by regressing treatment propensity scores on all covariates used in matching, on 
the matched and unmatched samples, substantially decreased after matching in 
all the cases. Matching clearly removed a large part of mean and median biases 
also across the board. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) suggest that a 
standardised difference of > 20 should be considered as “large.”  Our results 
show that, post-matching, none of the standardised differences have absolute 
values larger than 3. Finally, the Likelihood ratio turns insignificant in all the 
models in the matched samples, confirming the results of the previous two tests.   
 
Table 3: Kernel matching performance: results of the mean and median 
absolute bias, pseudo-R2 and LR tests 
  PsR2 LRchi2 p>chi2 Mean Bias 
Med 
Bias 
Unmatched 0.102 64.78 0 33.5 24.2 
Matched 0.002 0.49 1 2.6 2.2 
Unmatched 0.049 23.36 0.005 20.9 15.3 
Matched 0 0.06 1 1.3 1.1 
Unmatched 0.063 22.71 0.007 23.2 20.2 
Matched 0.006 0.65 1 3.3 1.1 
Unmatched 0.057 17.05 0.03 19.1 14.1 
Matched 0.002 0.14 1 3.2 2.6 
            
Unmatched 0.071 58.26 0.000 28 24.9 
Matched 0.001 0.27 1.000 2 1.1 
Unmatched 0.026 11.94 0.217 17 10.3 
Matched 0 0.03 1.000 0.8 0.6 
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Unmatched 0.024 11.8 0.225 13.4 11 
Matched 0.002 0.35 1.000 0.9 0.4 
Unmatched 0.015 3.88 0.867 19 9.6 
Matched 0 0.01 1.000 0.7 0.6 
 
The results based on the propensity score matching technique are presented in 
Table 4 and are discussed below.  
Table 4: Propensity score matching estimates of the average effect of 
foreign ownership and ownership stakes 
 2004-08 
 Foreign 
firms 
Local 
firms 
Technology 
spending 
indicator 
ATT Bootstrapped 
standard 
deviation 
t-statistics 
DFOR50  77 1549 RD_INT -.131 .079 -1.658* 
 77 1549 ROY_INT .520 .118 4.410*** 
 77 1549 CAPIMP_INT -.496 2.342 -.212 
DFOR25 53 1336 RD_INT 0.147 0.237 0.619 
 53 1336 ROY_INT 0.403 0.181 2.219** 
 53 1336 CAPIMP_INT -0.305 0.424 -0.721 
DFOR10 37 1305 RD_INT -0.168 0.165 -1.1018 
 37 1305 ROY_INT -0.018 0.061 -0.299 
 37 1305 CAPIMP_INT  0.615         1.173       0.524         
DFOR_EXP     30         1206 RD_INT -0.276 0.129 -2.132** 
     30         1206 ROY_INT -0.087 .050 -1.1734 
     30         1206 CAPIMP_INT 0.520 1.054 0.493 
 2009-2014 
DFOR50 109 1499 RD_INT 0.091 0.133 0.685 
 109 1499 ROY_INT 0.526 0.111 4.760*** 
 109 1499 CAPIMP_INT 0.136 0.320 0.426 
DFOR25 50 1340 RD_INT 0.604 0.560 1.079 
 50 1340 ROY_INT 0.220 0.120 1.830* 
 50 1340 CAPIMP_INT 0.291 0.464 0.627 
DFOR10 50 1340 RD_INT -.005 0.184 -0.027 
 50 1340 ROY_INT 0.031 0.046 0.672 
 50 1340 CAPIMP_INT -0.135 0.351 -0.384 
DFOR_EXP 26 1209 RD_INT 2.703 2.836 0.953 
 26 1209 ROY_INT 0.112 0.115 0.974 
 26 1209 CAPIMP_INT 0.034 0.569 0.059 
 
R&D activity: It may be seen that there are statistically significant differences in 
the average R&D intensity between local and foreign firms, in particular majority 
owned and experiential foreign firms during the pre-2008 period. However, 
contrary to our hypothesis 1, this difference is negative. These results appear to 
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be in line with the existing studies though. In a 1991 period study on the R&D 
behavior of manufacturing firms in India, Kumar and Aggarwal (2005) used the 
firm level data for 1992-93 to 1998-99. Their findings reveal that MNEs have 
increased their R&D expenditures faster than their local counterparts in 
response to the process of liberalization. However, after controlling for the 
effects of other firm specific characteristics, their average R&D intensity still 
turned out to be less than that of local firms. The study was revisited by 
Sasidharan and Kathuria (2013) who find that the average R&D intensity of 
foreign firms has been significantly lower than that of the local firms for the 
period 1994-2005.   
 
However, our study shows that in the post 2008 period, the R&D intensity of 
foreign firms increased faster across all groups closing the gap between them 
and their local counterparts. It could partly be due to second generation reforms 
in the FDI regime in India that were initiated in the post 2005 period. But more 
importantly, it could be due to worldwide economic crisis which might have 
affected companies’ offshoring strategies for R&D significantly by creating credit 
crunch in the developed world. This might have forced them to search for highly 
qualified personnel at low cost for their innovative activities for cost reduction. 
Recent studies do not confirm this explanation. A recent study by Kinkel and 
Som (2012) finds that German firms have actually reduced R&D relocation 
activities in the post crisis period. They argue that the companies seem to be 
more reluctant to new approaches with subjectively higher associated risks and 
to experimental learning of more advanced offshoring activities and modes. 
Their finding is confirmed by Dachs and Zahradnik (2014). They find that “in 
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most countries, R&D of foreign firms was more severely affected by the crisis 
than R&D of domestic firms”. Their argument is that multinationals may have 
reduced R&D relocation to lower coordination costs of dispersed R&D, or 
because of their political commitments to their home countries. But they do find 
exceptions in France, the UK and Poland which show a rising trends in R&D 
relocation activities. Our study shows that India has also succeeded in attracting 
R&D oriented FDI during this period mainly due to the availability of highly skilled 
manpower at low cost. There has been an increase in R&D activities by all 
groups of MNEs in the post crisis period. But, this did not result into significantly 
higher R&D spending by them when compared with that of local firms.  
 
Royalty payment intensity: Technology acquisitions through licensing 
arrangements show interesting results. During the first period, majority and 
dominant majority owned firms were found to be spending significantly more on 
royalty payments than their local counterparts. Evidently, secured and controlling 
stakes positively influence MNEs’ royalty payments to their parents. This 
confirms the classical view of greater embeddedness of majority owned firms in 
internal networks to protect the spillover of their proprietary technologies. This 
also translates into a slow process of R&D relocation by them. During the post 
crisis period, royalty payments showed an upward trend by and large for both 
local and foreign firms but foreign firms in all categories except the ‘dominant 
minority group’ increased it faster widening the gap with local firms. Despite 
getting slow, the dominant minority foreign firms maintained a significant gap 
with the local firms. Clearly, the technological activities of foreign firms 
particularly those with controlling stakes increased substantially in the post crisis 
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period. The results confirm our hypotheses 2 and 4.   
 
Capital goods imports: Expenditures on capital goods imports have been 
higher than that on the acquisition of disembodied technologies. Evidently, this 
has been a significant mode of technology transfer for firms for both the local 
and foreign owned, in the Indian context. The difference in the average spending 
on this mode of technology acquisition is not significantly different between the 
foreign and local firms in either period.   
  
Regression Analysis  
 
There has been a vast literature on the determinants of inter-firm differences in 
R&D intensity. This literature examines enterprise level R&D effort within a broad 
framework that associates it with several firm- and industry-specific attributes 
(See Kumar and Aggarwal, 2005; Sasidharan and Kathuria, 2013; see also, 
Cohen, 1995; Kumar and Siddharthan, 1997 for literature surveys). Adapting this 
broad framework to the present context, we estimated the following models for 
R&D (RD_INT) and international transfer of disembodied technologies 
(ROY_INT).  
 
RD_INT =  f(SIZE AGE CAPINT TECHEM ROY_INT EX_INT PCM DFOR50 
DFOR25 DFOR10 DFOR_EX HITECH-MFG MEDTECH-MFG LTECH-MFG 
HITECH-SER MTECH-SER TAX)…..(1) 
 
ROY_INT= f(SIZE AGE CAPINT RDS TECHDISEM EX PCM DFOR50 DFOR25 
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DFOR10 DFOR_EX HTECH-MFG MTECH-MFG LTECH-MFG HTECH-SER 
MTECH-SER TAX)…..(2) 
 
It must however be noted that the two modes of technology activity namely R&D 
and technology acquisition may not be alternative to each other. Technology 
imports by firms are likely to influence their R&D efforts but the intensity of 
technology imports may itself depend on R&D efforts. There is thus an issue to 
simultaneity between 1 and 2. Further, with respect to most explanatory 
variables in (1) and (2), there could be a problem of two-way causality. To 
address these issues we assume that both, technology choice and intensity are 
strategic decisions and have a long term orientation. They are not spontaneously 
determined by the firms on the basis of their current performances. Rather these 
strategic decisions are influenced by their past, current and planned behavior 
and performances. Therefore, the performance and behavioural explanatory 
variables: CAPINT ROY_INT TECHEM EX_INT PCM in model 1 and CAPINT 
RDS TECHEM EX_INT PCM in model 2 are converted into moving average of 
three years: lagged year, current year and lead year. TAX is a lagged variable. 
Inclusion of lagged and lead variables has addressed the issue of causality and 
simultaneity, and has allowed us to estimate the two models separately to 
explore the impact of foreign ownership on them.  
 
A panel data approach is employed to control for the unobserved firm and time 
specific characteristics. Using the propensity scores, the firms that are off the 
common support are dropped to include only those in the common support 
region and are matched. A fixed effect specification of the model would be an 
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ideal choice but is ruled out, as it does not return estimates of the main variables 
which are dummy variables. The only feasible way to estimate the model, 
therefore, is to use the random effect-specification. While estimating the model, 
we also took into account the year dummies to capture fixed effects of 
intertemporal shifts and corrected the estimates for heteroscedasticity for 
ensuring robustness of the estimates. The regression analysis is thus expected 
to produce doubly robust results.  
 
The GLS estimates of model are presented in Table 5. It may be seen that the 
regression results confirm the PSM based results. Firms with ownership stakes 
higher than the threshold of 25% are more likely to import technologies than their 
local counterparts.  
 
 
Table 5: GLS estimates of R&D and technology transfers: 2004-2008 and 
2009-2014 on matched sample 
 
 2004-08 2009-14 
 RD_INT ROY_INT  RD_INT  ROY_INT 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 5 Model 9 Model 13 
SIZE -0.0149 0.0272* 0.0489 0.0314** 
 (-0.741) (1.716) (1.430) (2.113) 
SIZE2 0.00480 -0.000495 -0.00402 -0.00198 
 (1.512) (-0.307) (-0.925) (-1.508) 
AGE -0.00381** 7.14e-05 -0.00428** 0.000673 
 (-2.082) (0.0387) (-2.057) (0.489) 
ROY_INT#  -0.00330  -0.0911  
 (-0.770)  (-1.112)  
RDS #  -0.000169  -0.00667 
  (-0.452)  (-1.177) 
CAPINT # -4.93e-06 4.01e-06* -5.58e-07 1.15e-07 
 (-0.672) (1.722) (-0.759) (0.340) 
CAPIMP# 0.00831 -0.000104 0.000207 2.30e-05 
 (0.845) (-0.234) (0.935) (0.210) 
EXINT # 0.0198*** 0.000595 0.0169*** -0.000569 
 (2.638) (0.617) (3.018) (-0.886) 
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IMPR_INT# -0.00911*** -0.000325 0.00111 0.00123* 
 (-2.648) (-0.636) (0.422) (1.700) 
PCM# -2.89e-06 5.48e-07 1.42e-05 1.84e-07 
 (-1.276) (0.419) (1.261) (0.298) 
MTECH_SER -0.0332 -0.0791 -0.109* 0.0292* 
 (-0.655) (-0.726) (-1.769) (1.688) 
HTECH_SER 0.179 0.110 0.133 0.208*** 
 (1.290) (0.679) (0.947) (2.823) 
HTECH_MFG 0.448*** -0.0469 0.454*** 0.0961*** 
 (5.014) (-0.342) (4.708) (4.815) 
MTECH_MFG -0.0311 -0.125 -0.159*** 0.0130 
 (-0.754) (-1.047) (-2.805) (0.874) 
DFOR50 -0.296*** 0.450*** 0.0565 0.520*** 
 (-3.517) (3.948) (0.401) (4.883) 
DFOR25 -0.109 0.482**   -0.0490 0.242* 
 (-0.908) (2.228) (-0.420) (1.771) 
DFOR10 -0.268*** 0.00817 -0.0835 0.0377 
 (-3.321) (0.180) (-0.720) (0.894) 
DFOR_EXP -0.189* -0.0735 0.583 0.186 
 (-1.761) (-1.192) (0.721) (1.067) 
TAX## -8.71e-07 -9.07e-07 -1.16e-06 2.11e-06 
 (-0.265) (-1.006) (-0.518) (1.168) 
Constant 0.122 -0.0659 0.204** -0.175*** 
 (1.037) (-0.716) (2.113) (-3.033) 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES 
Observations 4,800 4,800 5,229 5,229 
Number of code 1,690 1,690 1,615 1,615 
Note: # represents Three years; moving average; ## represent lagged 
variable 
*** Significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%*: significant at 10% 
 
DFOR50 and DFOR25 turn out to be significant in all specifications for ROY_INT 
both the periods. Our results thus indicate that the majority owned and dominant 
minority owned firms spend a considerable more amount of money on R&D 
performed abroad (in their parent companies) than the local firms. On the other 
hand, the DFOR50 and DFOR25 exhibit ambiguous results in the RD_INT 
specifications. As a matter of fact, R&D spending of foreign firms across all 
categories is less than that of local firms during the first period. It was only during 
the crisis that these firms increased R&D relocation to India. But the change has 
been marginal. On an average, foreign firms are not technologically embedded 
in India. They are more likely to depend on their parent labs. 
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 Among the control variables, it is interesting to note that the R&D and royalty 
intensities are affected differently by the strategic explanatory variables. High 
tech sectors in both manufacturing and services attract significant technology 
transfers; but those in manufacturing alone induce significantly higher R&D 
intensities. Thus promoting manufacturing is more likely to accelerate R&D 
efforts in Indian industries. Further, exporting is significantly associated with local 
R&D efforts; its relationship with technology imports turns out to be insignificant. 
Younger but large sized firms are more likely to undertake R&D; relatively 
smaller firms exhibit a greater tendency to import technologies. Finally, global 
conditions seem to affect R&D and technology transfers differently. However, the 
relationship between them is not found to be significant in any case. Thus 
technology transfers may not positively influence local R&D efforts. It is 
important to identify the triggers for the latter to augment technological 
capabilities of firms.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The majority owned and dominant minority owned firms are considered as 
conduits of technology transfers but evidently, their local R&D efforts are not 
significantly different from those of their local counterparts in the Indian context. 
The activities of technology generation are still concentrated in the home 
countries of MNEs located in India. A mere presence of MNEs as has been 
hypothesized in the literature may not be sufficient to generate knowledge 
spillover effects. The role of FDI in technology diffusion in this case depends on 
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the strengths and weaknesses of the local innovation systems and firms’ 
competitiveness. In general, MNEs’ R&D efforts, by cultivating closer ties to host 
companies and research institutes are an important source of technology 
spillovers. But their decision to relocate R&D to a host country itself depends in 
part on the strengths and weaknesses of the local R&D infrastructure.  
 
This has an important policy implication for the government of India to improve 
local R&D infrastructure. It can alone play a vital role for promoting technological 
efforts by foreign subsidiaries and augment host country R&D base in general. 
Thus, much depends on the local absorptive capacity. MNEs relocate production 
and R&D to exploit the host country’s comparative advantages to augment their 
own competitiveness. The host developing countries must therefore strengthen 
their own capabilities to exploit the benefits generated from their presence.    
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Appendix A1 
 
Foreign ownership: This analysis identifies the following 5 groups of firms for the 
analysis 
 
 DFOR10: firms that had predominantly been minority holders ( 10-25%). 
Predominantly means that in more than two third of the period. 
 DFOR25: Firms that had been dominant minority holders (25-50%) 
 DFOR50: Firms that had been majority holders (above 50%) 
 DFOR_EXP: The remaining firms that had been under 25% or more foreign 
ownership stake in at least one of the years but less than 66% of the period.   
 Dom: Purely local firms  
 
Modes and intensities of technological activities: 
  
 RD_INT:  total R&D expenditure of ith firm as a proportion of its sales  
 ROY_INT (Acquisition of disembodied technologies) : Royalties and technical fee 
paid abroad by ith firm as a proportion of its sales 
 CAPIMP_INT (Acquisition of embodied technologies) : Imports of capital goods by 
ith firm as a proportion of its sales 
 
Firm specific variables 
 
 SIZE: net sales (transformed into logarithms)  
 SIZE2: Square of SIZE 
 AGE : The current year net of the year of incorporation  
 ADINT: (Branding intensity): Spending on advertisement and sales promotion as % 
of net sales  
 EX_INT: Exports of goods and services as % of net sales  
 CAPINT: Net fixed assets as % of net sales 
 IMPR_INT: Imports of raw materials and components as % of net sales  
 PCM: profits before tax as % of net sales 
 Tax: Profits before tax as a proportion of profit after tax.  
 
Sector specific 
 
 MFG= 1 if the industry belongs to manufacturing; =0 if it is in the service sector 
41 
 
 HTECH_MFG: High Tech and high product differentiation manufacturing industry 
=1  
 MTECH_MFG Medium technology and high product differentiation manufacturing 
industry=1 
 LTECH_MFG: Low technology and low product differentiation manufacturing 
industry=1 
 HTECH_SER: High Tech and high product differentiation service industries 
 MTECH_SER :Medium tech high product differentiation services 
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